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We study the implications of loss aversion for trade policy determination and show how it allows 
us to explain a number of important and puzzling features of trade policy. In particular, we show 
that if individual preferences exhibit loss aversion and the coefficient of loss aversion is large 
enough, there will be an anti-trade bias in trade policy. We also show that, for a sufficiently high 
coefficient of loss aversion, more import-competing lobbies will form than under the current 
leading political economy model of trade protection due to Grossman and Helpman (1994), and 
import-competing sectors will be more likely to form a lobby than export sectors, reinforcing the 
anti-trade bias result. The predictions for protection that we obtain also imply that, everything 
else equal, higher protection will be given to those sectors in which profitability is declining. We 
use a nonlinear regression procedure to directly estimate the parameters of the model and test the 
empirical validity of its predictions. We find empirical support for the model and, very 
importantly, we obtain estimates of the parameters that are very close to those estimated by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) using experimental data. In order to test some predictions on the 
lobbying side, we estimate a Probit equation on political organization using the two-stage 
conditional maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988), and find 
evidence of loss aversion in lobby formation. Finally but importantly, we find that the data favors 
our model over the Grossman and Helpman model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  Although economists are usually opposed to protectionism, governments continue 
to use trade policy on a widespread basis. The importance of the use of trade policy has 
led to a significant development of the literature on the political economy of protection, 
with an increasing interest in estimating the determinants of protection as directly derived 
from models that have micro-foundations. In that context, the Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) (henceforth GH) model has become the leading political economy model because, 
by explicitly modeling government-industry interactions, it derives from first principles a 
set of predictions about the determinants of protection. Furthermore, its predictions are 
directly testable, which has led to several empirical evaluations of the model.
2 However, 
despite the fact that the GH model has the advantage of being very parsimonious and 
yielding clear-cut empirical predictions, it fails to explain some basic features of trade 
policy, and thus a number of puzzles remain. For instance, it cannot explain the anti-trade 
bias in trade policy (which we describe below) and, in fact, as Levy (1999) shows, under 
some neutrality assumptions it predicts a pro-trade bias.
3 Similarly, it does not explain 
why protection is usually given to industries in which profits and employment are 
declining.  
  In this paper we study the effects of loss aversion on trade policy determination 
and show how it allows us to explain a number of important features of trade policy. In 
particular, we show that if individual preferences exhibit loss aversion and the coefficient 
of loss aversion is large enough, there will be an anti-trade bias in trade policy. In 
addition, we obtain lobby formation predictions that reinforce the anti-trade bias result. 
We also show that, if there is loss aversion, higher protection will be given to those 
sectors in which profitability is declining, everything else equal. The concept of loss 
aversion is due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who show empirical evidence that 
indicates that individuals place a larger welfare weight on the loss of a given amount of 
                                                 
2 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) were the first to test its 
predictions. 
3 We should point out that it is possible to obtain an anti-trade bias in the Grossman and Helpman model if, 
for instance, there is only one non-numeraire good and it is imported or if we introduce some artificial 
asymmetries. 
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income than on a gain of the same amount. Empirical estimates of loss aversion are 
typically close to 2, implying that the disutility of giving something up is twice as large 
as the utility of acquiring it
4. Accounting for loss aversion seems particularly worthy 
given that the concept is gaining increased recognition in the economics literature as an 
important explanation for several patterns of human behavior. Its popularity is due 
mainly to the fact that it can explain many phenomena that remain paradoxes in 
traditional choice theory, such as the endowment effect (Thaler [1980]) and the equity 
premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler [1995]).  
  Since the introduction of loss aversion to individual preferences in a model of 
endogenous protection leads to predictions for protection that allow us to explain some 
important and puzzling features of trade policy, we use a nonlinear regression procedure 
to test the empirical validity of those predictions as well as to directly estimate the 
parameters of the model. We find empirical support for the model. Very importantly, we 
obtain estimates of the parameters that are very close to those estimated by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1992) using experimental data. In particular, we find that losses have a 
larger impact on protection than gains, and we obtain estimates of the coefficient of loss 
aversion that are about 2, consistent with the findings of the previous literature. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that provides econometric estimates from data not 
generated by experiments of all the parameters of the value function proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992).
5 Given that our predictions for protection differ from 
those of GH (1994), we compare the empirical performance of both models and find that 
the standard information criteria favor our model over the GH model. These results 
contrast with those of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999), who find that introducing additional variables in the estimation of the GH model 
does not significantly improve its explanatory power. Our approach differs from theirs, 
however, in that we have a well-specified alternative hypothesis.  
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), and Kahneman and Tversky (1992). 
5 Besides the estimations that use data from experiments, we know of two papers that estimate the loss 
aversion coefficient. Putler (1992) estimated separate demand elasticities for increases and decreases in the 
retail price of shell eggs relative to a reference price and obtains a ratio of 2.4. Hardie, Johnson and Fader 
(1993) estimate coefficients of loss aversion for quality in the case of orange juice that are also about 2; 
however, they assume that the value functions are linear and thus do not test for diminishing sensitivity and 
do not estimate the corresponding parameter.   3
  Finally, given that in the model the influence that special interest groups exert on 
policy makers by means of political contributions is a crucial determinant of protection, 
we estimate a Probit equation on political organization using the two-stage conditional 
maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and we find 
evidence of loss aversion in lobby formation. The fact that we test some predictions 
obtained by endogenizing lobby formation also differs from the empirical work of 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999), who estimate a 
version of the GH model which takes lobby formation as exogenous.
6 
  Since an important objective of the paper is to explain the anti-trade bias puzzle, 
we proceed to say more about it. A common answer to the question of why free trade is 
so rarely practiced relies on the government’s use of trade policy to redistribute income 
toward specific groups. However, as Rodrik (1995) says, an equally important puzzle 
remains: Why is trade policy typically biased in favor of import-competing sectors, being 
therefore trade restricting rather than trade promoting? This puzzle is particularly relevant 
for small economies, given that they cannot use tariffs to improve their terms of trade. 
Nonetheless, some of the political economy models of endogenous protection get rid of 
the puzzle by introducing some artificial assumptions.
7 Moreover, as we already 
mentioned, the current leading political economy model, due to Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), not only cannot explain the anti-trade bias in trade policy but also, as Levy (1999) 
shows, under some symmetry assumptions it predicts a pro-trade bias. 
  In a model of endogenous protection, we show that if individual preferences 
exhibit loss aversion and the coefficient of loss aversion is large enough, there will be an 
anti-trade bias in trade policy. The intuition is as follows. Consider two non-numeraire 
goods, good 1 and good 2, and start with complete symmetry between sectors in both 
consumption and production, and assume that under autarky their domestic prices are 
equal to the world price, which in turn equals unity by the choice of units. Then, 
introduce a shock that causes the economy to import good 2 and export good 1, for 
                                                 
6 They allow for the political organization variable to be potentially endogenous in the estimation of the 
protection equation but they do not test any predictions on political organization obtained from 
endogenizing lobby formation. 
7 For instance, the tariff-formation function approach, first used by Findlay and Wellisz (1982), assumes 
that interest groups lobby for tariffs but not export subsidies. Similarly, the political-support function 
approach a la Hillman (1982) assumes that the policymaker wants support from import-competing interest 
groups but not from exporting ones.   4
instance a shock that changes the endowments of the specific factors in a way such that 
output of good 1 increases by 1 percent and that of good 2 decreases by 1 percent. This 
shock leads to a loss for the owners of the import-competing factor that looms larger than 
the gain of the owners of the export factor, and if the coefficient of loss aversion is 
sufficiently high, this effect (which we call the “loss aversion effect”) dominates the 
effect of a higher output in the export sector than in the import-competing sector (the 
“size effect”) and the tariff will be higher than the export subsidy. This contrasts with the 
GH (1994) model, in which we only have the size effect and, since the level of protection 
is proportional to industry output, the tariff turns out to be lower than the export subsidy. 
  We find that alternative shocks that lead the country to trade both of the non-
numeraire goods, such as a technological shock that increases productivity in sector 1 and 
reduces productivity in sector 2 or a shock that increases the world price of good 1 and 
decreases the world price of good 2, will also generate an anti-trade bias if the coefficient 
of loss aversion is large enough. We also provide the condition that must hold to have an 
anti-trade bias when we do not impose any symmetry assumptions, and discuss the cases 
that take place under the different possible initial output relations. In addition, we show 
that the anti-trade bias also arises between two large countries even if cooperation 
removes the terms-of-trade motive for the use of trade protection. 
  We then endogenize lobby formation and show that, for a high enough coefficient 
of loss aversion, 1) more import-competing lobbies will form than under the original GH 
model, and 2) import competing sectors will be more likely to form a lobby than export 
sectors. The intuition for the first result is that, when the country opens to trade, the 
benefit of forming a lobby and avoiding a loss has an extra effect on utility  once loss 
aversion is taken into account, and the additional protection associated with becoming 
organized is also higher than under the GH model. As for the second result, the reason is 
that if importers lose and exporters gain when the country opens to trade (in the absence 
of intervention), the cost of remaining unorganized is higher for the importers provided 
that the coefficient of loss aversion is sufficiently large.  
  The next section discusses the literature related to the anti-trade bias in trade 
policy and describes the concept of loss aversion, its implications and the empirical 
evidence that supports it. In Section 3 we present the model and solve for the equilibrium   5
trade policy, and we show that if preferences exhibit loss aversion, higher protection will 
be given to sectors in which profits are declining, everything else equal. Section 4 shows 
that if there is loss aversion and the coefficient of loss aversion is sufficiently large, then 
trade policy will have an anti-trade bias. In Section 5 we endogenize lobby formation and 
show that, for a high enough coefficient of loss aversion, more import-competing lobbies 
will form than under the original GH model, and import competing sectors will be more 
likely to form a lobby than export sectors. In Section 6 we estimate the parameters of the 
model and provide empirical evidence of the relevance of loss aversion for trade policy 




2.1. The Anti-Trade Bias 
 
  In this section we will cite some of the explanations that have been provided by 
the literature concerning the anti-trade bias in trade policy.
8 As Rodrik (1995) mentions, 
one possible answer is that tariffs were initially imposed for revenue reasons and that the 
anti-trade bias persists due to some bias toward the status quo. In that line, Fernandez and 
Rodrik (1991) provide an answer to the question of persistence on the basis of uncertainty 
regarding the redistribution of gains and losses from a reform. They show that there is a 
bias toward the status quo, and therefore against efficiency enhancing reforms such as 
trade liberalization, if some of the winners and losers from the reform cannot be 
identified ex ante. As a result, liberalization may be rejected under majority voting even 
though it would have received adequate political support ex post had it been adopted. 
Another explanation that relates the anti-trade bias to a status quo bias is due to a 
conservative welfare function postulated by Corden (1974), by which politicians place a 
larger weight on reductions than on increases in income
9. However, these arguments do 
not address the important issue of explaining the initial structure of protection, but rather 
take it as given. In addition, except for the case of developing countries, we can question 
                                                 
8 See Limão and Panagariya (2002) for a summary of this literature. 
9 Nonetheless, it is not clear why this is so. Also, we will focus on the effects of loss aversion on the 
behavior of firms and lobbying groups.   6
the importance of the revenue motive for the use of trade policy in most of the other 
countries at present, as well as for the use of quantity restrictions that do not produce 
revenue.
10  
  Olson (1983) states that negative shocks will lead to more lobby formation due to 
the fact that they reduce the benefit for potential entrants to the industry and therefore the 
free-rider problem associated with lobby formation is attenuated. If negative shocks 
affect primarily import-competing sectors this could lead to an anti-trade bias. 
Nevertheless, those shocks would also increase the probability of exiting the industry, 
reducing the expected benefit of lobby formation.
11 
  Combining analytical and numerical techniques, Eaton and Grossman (1985) 
show that trade policy will often have an anti-trade bias in a small economy that faces 
uncertain terms of trade if some factors are immobile ex post and insurance markets are 
incomplete. They assume that when capital is allocated between production activities the 
terms of trade are unknown. A tariff redistributes income toward the group with a higher 
marginal utility in either of the two states of nature considered, acting as a partial 
substitute for insurance. However, Dixit has shown in various papers that not explicitly 
modeling the causes for markets to be incomplete can yield erroneous policy proposals.
12  
  Finally, Limão and Panagariya (2002) use a general equilibrium model to show 
that if the government’s objective reflects a concern for inequality, or diminishing 
political support from factor owners, then trade policy exhibits an anti-trade bias. The 
reason is that, starting from a symmetric equilibrium, the same shock that leads the 
economy to trade leaves the owners of the import factor worse off relative to the owners 
of the export factor, and a tariff reverses some of this equity loss. Our approach differs 
from theirs in that we explicitly model the political process, and that we rely on loss 
aversion in individual preferences instead of an inequality concern on the part of the 
government to explain the anti-trade bias. 
 
                                                 
10 Finally, as Limão and Panagariya (2003) point out, even though tariff protection for a given industry is 
persistent in the short and medium run, over longer periods the pattern of trade changes significantly as 
countries develop, making it hard to argue that the status quo bias can explain persistence over decades. 
11 Moreover, it is not clear why import-competing sectors would be subject to more frequent and larger 
negative shocks. 
12 See, for instance, Dixit (1989). We should point out that, in contrast to theirs, our argument does not rely 
on uncertainty or incomplete markets.   7
2.2. Loss Aversion 
 
  In expected utility theory, the domain of the utility function is final assets, rather 
than gains or losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide evidence that indicates that 
value or utility is determined by changes in wealth,
 and thus they emphasize the 
importance of changes as opposed to final asset positions that include current wealth.
13 
  Another important characteristic of preferences of which Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) find evidence is that the disutility that one experiences in losing a sum of money is 
greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount. This phenomenon is 
called loss aversion and it leads to a utility function that is steeper for losses than for 
gains. The concept was first defined in the framework of prospect theory and then 
extended to choice under certainty (Tversky and Kahneman [1991]). 
  An immediate consequence of loss aversion is what Thaler (1980) called the 
endowment effect: the loss of utility associated with giving up a valued good is greater 
than the utility gain associated with receiving it. Value seems to change once a good is 
incorporated into one’s endowment. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) ran a series 
of experiments which provide evidence of the endowment effect and suggest a coefficient 
of loss aversion slightly greater than 2.
14 Tversky and Kahneman (1990) also observed a 
ratio of just over 2:1 in several experiments involving risky choices. In one gambling 
experiment with real payoffs, for instance, a 50-50 bet to win $25 or lose $10 was barely 
acceptable, yielding a ratio of 2.5 to 1. Similar values were obtained from choices 
involving larger gambles, over a range of several hundred dollars. They conclude that 
“[the] findings suggest that a loss aversion coefficient of about two may explain both 
                                                 
13 Markowitz (1952) was the first to propose that utility be defined on gains and losses rather than on final 
asset positions. Nonetheless, as the authors point out, the emphasis on changes does not imply that the 
value of a particular change is independent on the initial position. Value should be treated as a function in 
two arguments: the asset position and the magnitude of the change from the reference point (although the 
representation as a function of one argument can be a satisfactory approximation when changes are small or 
even moderate). 
14 In one of the experiments, a decorated mug with retail value of about $5 was given to some of the 
students in a classroom. These students (“the sellers”) indicated the price at which they would be willing to 
sell their mug, and the students who had not received a mug (the “choosers”) indicated their preferences 
between receiving a mug and certain sums of money. The sellers and choosers differ only in that the former 
evaluate the mug as a loss and the latter as a gain. Loss aversion requires that the rate of exchange between 
the mug and money be different in the two cases. Indeed, the median value of the mug was $7.12 for the 
sellers and $3.12 for the choosers in one experiment, and $7.00 and $3.50 in another.   8
risky and riskless choices involving monetary outcomes and consumption goods.” 
(Tversky and Kahneman [1991], p.1054).   
  Another implication of loss aversion is what has been called the status quo bias: 
individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because the disadvantages 
of leaving it receive more weight than the advantages.
15 
  Finally, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find evidence of what they call 
diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their 
size. 
  Based on the findings described above, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) propose a 
value function defined over gains and losses relative to some reference point -such as the 
status quo- with a slope that changes abruptly at the reference point, consistent with loss 





















whereλ is the coefficient of loss aversion. They estimatedα andβ  to be 0.88 (consistent 
with diminishing sensitivity) andλ to be 2.25.
16 Also, xis measured as the difference in 
wealth with respect to the last time wealth was measured.  
  We should point out that although the fact that the displeasure from a monetary 
loss is greater than the pleasure from a similar gain is also implied by a standard concave 
utility function, loss aversion implies that the slope of the value function changes 
abruptly at the reference level, so that we have a pronounced asymmetry even for 
arbitrarily small gains and losses. As Tversky and Kahneman (1992) say “The observed 
                                                 
15 The experiment mentioned above is an illustration of this. Knetsch (1989) conducts an experiment where 
students in two undergraduate classes were required to answer a brief questionnaire. Immediately after, 
students in one of the classes were given decorated mugs as compensation, while students in the other class 
received a large bar of Swiss chocolate. Then, students were asked if they wanted to trade their gift for the 
other by raising a card with the word “Trade” written on it. Although the transaction costs were small, 
about 90 percent of the participants chose to retain the gift they had received. See also Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser (1988), who demonstrated this effect using different experiments. 
16 The estimation was based on an experiment involving 25 graduate students from Berkeley and Standford, 
in which subjects indicated preferences between different sure outcomes and a risky prospect. Certainty 
equivalents were thus derived from observed choices, and the authors used a nonlinear regression 
procedure to estimate the parameters separately for each subject and then obtained their median values.   9
asymmetry between gains and losses is far too extreme to be explained by income effects 
or by decreasing risk aversion.” (p. 298). In fact, an important aspect of loss aversion is 
that it can resolve the criticism on expected utility put forward by Rabin (2000) and 
Rabin and Thaler (2001), who show that for any concave utility function, even very little 
risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over larger 
stakes.
17 
  Besides the experimental evidence on loss aversion, we can mention some other 
studies related to the topic. These include Dunn (1996), who using survey evidence from 
seven labor markets, presents empirically determined indifference functions for income 
and leisure which exhibit the phenomenon of loss aversion, and this in turn can explain 
the theoretically unexpected stability observed in labor markets when there is an overtime 
premium. Some theoretical papers that incorporate loss aversion into worker’s 
preferences are Bhaskar (1990) and Mc Donald and Sibly (2001). In addition, Shea 
(1995) finds that consumption responds more strongly to predictable income declines 
than to predictable income increases. That asymmetry is consistent with models in which 
preferences exhibit loss aversion. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) use loss aversion to explain 
the equity premium puzzle. In recent years, loss aversion has also been frequently applied 
in behavioral finance. For example, Barberis et al. (2001) introduce loss aversion into 
investor preferences and show that their model reproduces some puzzling features of 
aggregate asset pricing data, such as the high mean, volatility and predictability of stock 
returns. Similarly, Barberis and Huang (2001) use loss aversion to explain the time series 
and cross-sectional behavior of individual stocks. 
 
3. The Model 
 
  We consider a small competitive economy that takes the world prices as given.
18 
Individuals have identical preferences but may differ in their factor endowments. They 
maximize their utility, which is given by 
 
                                                 
17 For example, Rabin (2000) shows that a person who turns down a 50-50 bet of losing $100 and gaining 
$110 would also turn down a 50-50 bet of losing $1000 and gaining any amount of money! 
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where  0 x is consumption of the numeraire good;  i x denotes consumption of good i, i = 1, 
2, ... , n; E
~
is income derived from the sale of factor endowments; the superscript (-1) 
denotes that the variable is lagged one period; and 1 > λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. 
The sub-utility functions are differentiable, increasing and strictly concave.  
  In contrast to the GH (1994) model, individuals in our model derive utility (or 
value) not only from consumption levels but also from changes in their income, with 
losses looming larger than gains, consistent with the theory developed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). Thus, the first term in (1), given by  ∑ + ) ( 0 i i x u x , reflects utility over 
consumption.  The second term captures the idea that individuals care about changes in 
their wealth or income in a way consistent with loss aversion.
19  
  An individual with income E  will consume 
1 )] ( ' [ ) (
− = = i i i i i p u p d x of good i, 
and  ∑ − =
i i i i p d p E x ) ( 0 of the numeraire good. The indirect utility function is: 
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where p is the vector of domestic prices and the consumer surplus derived from the non-
numeraire goods is given by  ( ) ∑ ∑ − =
i i i i i i i i p d p p d u s ) ( ) ( ) (p . 
                                                 
19 Other authors have incorporated loss aversion in a similar manner. For instance, Barberis et al. (2001) 
and Barberis and Huang (2001) model utility as the sum of one term capturing utility over consumption and 
another term capturing the effect of changes in wealth. As they point out, it is important to note that even if 
the second term were not present, individuals would still care about changes in income just because of what 
those changes mean for consumption, and that by adding the second term we take the view that changes in 
income generate utility over and above the indirect utility that comes through consumption. (See Barberis 
et al. [1999] p. 8 , Barberis et al. [2001] pp. 6-7 and Barberis and Huang [2001] p. 1256 for a discussion).   11
  Good 0 is manufactured from labor alone with constant returns to scale and an 
input-output coefficient equal to 1. It is assumed that the supply of labor is large enough 
to ensure that some of this good is always produced. Then, the wage rate equals 1 in 
equilibrium. Each of the non-numeraire goods is produced using labor and a sector-
specific factor, with constant returns to scale. The supply of the specific factors is fixed. 
Since the wage is fixed, the rents derived from the specific factors are a function of the 
domestic price only. We denote these rewards by ) ( i i p Π . By Hotelling’s lemma, output 
is given by ) ( i i i p y Π′ = . 
  The government can implement trade taxes and subsidies. The net per capita 
revenue from all taxes and subsidies is: 
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i p is the world price of good i and N measures the total population. We assume 
that the government redistributes revenue uniformly to all of the individuals (voters) and 
so r(p) gives the net transfer to each individual.  
  An individual derives income from wages and government transfers, and maybe 
from the ownership of some specific factor. We assume that they own at most one of the 
specific factors. The owners of the specific factor used in industry i may decide to 
organize themselves into lobby groups. For now we will assume that in some exogenous 
set of sectors L, the specific factors have been able to organize for political activity, as in 
GH (1994).
20 Each lobby offers the government a contribution schedule, ) (p i C , which 
maps every policy that the government might choose into a campaign contribution level. 
We denote the joint welfare of the members of lobby i by  i i i C W V − = , where  i W is their 
gross-of-contributions joint welfare, given by:
 21 
 
                                                 
20 Later on we will endogenize lobby formation. 
21 We assume that either there is a single owner of each specific factor or that each lobby evaluates its 
welfare as a group.   12
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where i l is the labor supply (also labor income) of the owners of the specific input used in 
industry i, and  i θ is the fraction of the population that owns some of this factor. We will 
assume, for simplicity, that ownership in any given sector is highly concentrated, so that 
0 → i θ . This allows us to abstract from the effects of lobby competition and focus on the 
interaction between the government and each of the lobbies. Therefore, we have that, for 
lobby i,  i i i i i i i i i E p l r p l E
~
) ( ) ( ) ( ≡ Π + = + Π + ≡ p θ  and:
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) 1 (− Π i i p denotes last period’s profits for the lobby. 
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where social welfare is given by: 
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22 We take the factor endowments of each individual as constant across periods. Therefore, 
) ( ) (
) 1 (− Π < Π i i i i p p if and only if
) 1 (− < i i E E  and  ) ( ) (
) 1 (− Π ≥ Π i i i i p p  if and only if
) 1 (− ≥ i i E E .   13
  The game is a two-stage noncooperative game in which the lobbies 
simultaneously choose their political contribution schedules in the first stage and the 
government sets the policy and collects the contributions associated with it in the second, 
as in GH (1994). They define the equilibrium drawing on the work of Bernheim and 
Whinston (1986).
23  
  In the Appendix we derive the equilibrium policies for both organized and 
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∗ ∗ − = i i i i p p p t / ) ~ ( ~ is the equilibrium ad valorem trade tax or subsidy,  1 = i I if 
L i∈ and zero otherwise,  ) ~ ( / ) ~ ( ~
i i i i i p m p y z = is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output 
to imports (negative for exports) and  ) ~ ( / ~ ) ~ ( ~
i i i i i i p m p p m e ′ − = is the elasticity of import 
demand (defined to be positive) or export supply (defined to be negative). 
  The presence of protection for the unorganized sectors is due to the direct effect 
on utility generated by changes in income with respect to its reference level.
24 In addition, 
we can distinguish the effect that loss aversion has on protection from a status-quo bias 
effect. For a sector that experiences a loss, loss aversion works in the direction of 
increasing protection in order to attenuate the negative effect the loss has on utility, and 
hence in that case we could say that it moves the agents toward their status quo utility 
                                                 
23 In particular, they state that  { } ( )
0 0 , p L i i C ∈ is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if: 
a) 
0
i C is feasible for all  L i∈ ; b) 
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0 p p on P; c) 





i j j aW C C W ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
0 0 p p p p on P for every  L j ∈ ; and d) for every L j ∈ there exists a  P





i aW C ) ( ) (
0 p p on P such that  0 ) (
0 = j j C p . 
 
24 Thus, we should also point out that if exporters gain when the country opens to trade, the fact that a gain 
increases utility leads to protection for the exporters even if they are unorganized.   14
level. However, if we consider a sector that experiences a gain, loss aversion also leads to 
an increase in protection,
25 because gains have a positive effect on utility and, therefore, 
in that case it tends to move the agents further away from the status quo.
26 




















        ( 9 )  
 
we can see that in that model past profits, and more precisely whether the sector is better 
off or worse off with respect to the previous period, play no role in determining the levels 
of protection. 
  The result of our model implies that, given symmetry between two sectors in 
everything (including size) except in that one experienced a loss ( ) ( ) ( )
) 1 (− Π < Π i i i i p p , 
and the other a gain ( ) ( ) ( )
) 1 (− Π > Π i i i i p p , with the magnitude of the loss and gain being 
also similar, the sector that experienced a loss receives higher protection (a higher import 
tariff or export subsidy) than the one that gained. The reason is that under loss aversion 
losses loom larger than gains. In particular, if we recall that Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992) estimated bothα andβ  to be 0.88 andλ to be about 2, the second term inside the 
brackets in (8) would be approximately twice as large for the sector that is worse off as 
compared to that for the sector that is better off. Hence, while the GH model does not 
explain why protection is usually given to sectors in which profits are declining, our 
model implies that, if there is loss aversion, higher protection will be given to those 
                                                 
25 Nonetheless, for two sectors that are symmetric in everything except that one had a loss and the other a 
gain of equal magnitude, loss aversion leads to higher protection for the sector that experienced a loss. 
Below we say more about this. 
26 This does not imply, however, that loss aversion is inconsistent with a status quo bias in the sense that 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) defined it. For example, consider a trade reform that would benefit the 
export sector and hurt the import sector, and suppose there is uncertainty about which individuals would 
end up working in the export sector and which in the import sector, as in Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). In 
that case loss aversion may enhance a status quo bias because losses will be weighted more heavily than 
gains, and thus it would increase the probability of rejecting reforms even if they would benefit a majority 
ex post.    15
sectors in which profitability is declining, everything else equal. This will also have 
implications for the prediction of an anti-trade bias, as we discuss next.
27 
 
4. The Anti-trade Bias Puzzle 
 
  As Rodrik (1995) says, it is still a puzzle the fact that the net effect of trade policy 
is to restrict rather than promote trade (i.e., it contracts imports by more than it expands 
exports). The current leading political economy model of trade policy, due to GH (1994) 
not only cannot explain this puzzle but also, as Levy (1999) shows, under some 
symmetry assumptions predicts a pro-trade bias. Given its neutrality assumptions, this is 
the most natural starting point to study the bias that arises when an economy begins to 
trade with the rest of the world due to some shock. Later on we look at the cases in which 
the initial situation is not symmetric. In addition, the fact that the starting point in the case 
considered by Levy is an autarky situation is convenient given the importance of 
explaining initial protection. But, more broadly, we focus primarily on that case because 
our main objective is to explain how an anti-trade bias can arise under loss aversion in the 
same context that the GH model has been shown to predict a pro-trade bias. 
 
4.1. A small economy 
 
  Since the case that Levy (1999) analyzes is the benchmark against which we will 
first compare our results, we proceed to explain the intuition behind it. Consider the GH 
model with two non-numeraire goods, good 1 and good 2. Start with complete symmetry 
between sectors in consumption and production and assume that under autarky their 
domestic prices are equal to their respective world prices, which in turn equal unity by 
the choice of units. Suppose that the endowments of the specific factors change in a way 
such that the output of good 1 increases by 1 percent and that of good 2 contracts by 1 
percent. Good 1 then becomes an export good and good 2 and import good, with trade 
                                                 
27 We should also point out that even though we have referred to the reference income simply as income in 
the previous period, given the static nature of the model we shall think of it as the level of income before 
the last shock occurred, so that the optimal protection levels will not change as long as no new shocks 
occur.   16
balancing between them under no intervention. Now recall that the GH model predicts 
the equilibrium policy given by (9) and therefore an export subsidy on good 1 and a tariff 
on good 2 (provided that both sectors are organized). Moreover, given the symmetry 
assumption, the rate of the import tariff is lower than that of the export subsidy due to the 
fact that the export sector is larger and the level of protection is proportional to output. 
This implies that exports increase by more than imports decrease and therefore there is a 
pro-trade bias.
28 
  Let us now turn to the results under our model. Consider again two non-numeraire 
goods and similar symmetry assumptions. Introduce the same shock that increases output 
of good 1 by 1 percent and contracts output of good 2 by 1 percent. Given that the loss (in 
the absence of intervention) for the import sector is of equal magnitude than the gain for 
the export sector, without further assumptions the model can predict a pro or anti-trade 
bias.  The reason is that while on the one hand we have that the lower output in the 
import sector calls for a lower level of protection (the “size effect”), the loss experienced 
by that sector looms larger than the similar gain of the export sector, due to loss aversion, 
and the direction of the bias will depend on which of these two effects dominates. In 
particular, the model predicts an anti-trade bias if the following condition holds (at 
0 2 1 = = t t ) (See the Appendix for the proof): 
 
 
() ( ) []
()





















1 ) 1 (






















λ  (10) 
 
If we set  β α =
29 and let  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
) 1 (
1 1 1 1 2 2
) 1 (
2 2

























       ( 1 1 )  
                                                 
28 We should point out that it is possible to obtain an anti-trade bias in the Grossman and Helpman model 
if, for instance, there is only one non-numeraire good and it is imported. 
29 This is reasonable if we recall that Kahneman and Tversky (1992) estimated α and β to be 0.88. We 
also find empirical support for the assumption that  β α = , as shown in Section 6.   17
 
That is, for a sufficiently large coefficient of loss aversion, the model generates an anti-
trade bias. We should stress that  1 > λ is a necessary condition for (11) to hold, so that we 
need loss aversion to be present and the coefficient of loss aversion to be large enough.
30  
  Note that the inequality is more likely to hold if: a) the output of good 1 is not too 
large as compared to the output of good 2 (because if it were the export sector would 
have more to gain from protection); and b) the weight that the government places on 
social welfare is not too small (so that the asymmetry between the importers’ loss and the 
exporters’ gain receives more weight in the government’s objective). Figure 1 shows the 
values of λ (lambda) and a for which the model predicts an anti-trade bias
31.  
    
 
  More generally, without imposing the symmetry assumptions, any shock that 
increases the endowment of the specific factor used in the export sector and decreases 
that of the factor used in the import sector  will generate an anti-trade bias if and only if: 
 
                                                 
30 If we do not set  β α = one could have the condition holding forβ sufficiently larger than α even if 
1 = λ . However, havingβ greater than α would be an alternative way of modeling loss aversion, since it 
implies a larger effect on utility of losses versus gains. We prefer to model loss aversion by means of the 
coefficientλ , and letα andβ capture diminishing sensitivity, as do Kahneman and Tversky (1992). The 
main point is that, in any case, we need a discontinuity in the slope to obtain an anti-trade bias, and thus 
just having concavity on the change in income would not generate the result. 
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  Any technological shock that increases productivity in sector 1 and reduces 
productivity in sector 2 will have the same implications. 
  Finally, consider again a situation in which the domestic prices of goods 1 and 2 
under autarky are equal to their respective world prices. A shock that increases the world 
price of good 1 and decreases the world price of good 2 will cause good 1 to be exported 
and good 2 to be imported, generating an anti-trade bias if and only if (11’) holds. 
  We can generalize the results of this section by saying that any shock that induces 
the country to trade both of the non-numeraire goods causing a loss for the import sector 
(in the absence of protection) leads to  1 2 t t >  (i.e., the trade policy has an anti-trade 
bias) if and only if the coefficient of loss aversion is sufficiently large, such that equation 
(11’) holds. 
  Before relaxing the small-country assumption, let us go back to the asymmetric 
cases (i.e., without imposing any symmetry assumptions). Consider first a pre-trade 
situation in which output in sector 1 is larger than output in sector 2
32 and there is a shock 
that leads the country to export good 1 and import good 2 causing a loss for the import 
sector
33. As a result, after the shock we still have 2 1 y y > . Then the size effect calls for a 
lower level of protection in sector 2 than in sector 1, but the loss aversion effect goes in 
the opposite direction, calling for higher protection in the import sector. Hence, if the 
coefficient of loss aversion is high enough for condition (11’) to hold, there will be an 
anti-trade bias.  
  Now suppose that, initially, output is larger in sector 2 and introduce the same 
type of shock. If the ordering of outputs is reversed so that 1 2 y y <  after the shock, we 
have a situation similar to the one previously discussed in terms of the direction of the 
                                                 
32 Both prices still equal one by the choice of units. 
33 From our previous discussion of the various shocks that have these effects one can see that nearly all the 
possible shocks that lead the country to trade both of the non-numeraire goods will cause a loss from the 
import-competing sector.   19
effects, i.e. the size effect and the loss aversion effect work in opposite directions, and 
there will be an anti-trade bias if and only if equation (11’) holds. On the other hand, if 
the output ranking is preserved, that is,  1 2 y y >  after the shock, then both the size effect 
and the loss aversion effect work in the same direction, making the anti-trade bias 




2 2 / / ∆Π ∆Π = ∆Π ∆Π
− − β β
E E , 
and  1 1 2 2 m p m p ′ = ′  after the shock, the right hand side of (11’) will be less than 1
34. In that 
case (11’) will always hold (since it is sufficient that 1 ≥ λ ) and we get an anti-trade bias 
for sure. Finally, if 1 2 y y =  after the shock, then only the loss aversion effect is present, 





2 2 / / ∆Π ∆Π = ∆Π ∆Π
− − β β
E E and 1 1 2 2 m p m p ′ = ′ , the right hand side of (11’) 
will equal 1 and we get an anti-trade bias (since by definition 1 > λ under loss aversion).
35  
 
4.2. Two large countries 
 
  We now turn to the case of large economies. Consider a world with two countries, 
home and foreign, that are identical in all respects. Initially there is no motive for trade or 
for a tariff or subsidy. Next, consider a shock that causes the following: 
∗ ∗ = > = 1 2 2 1 y y y y ,
36 where the stars denote foreign country variables.  
  Since the optimum tariff argument can easily generate an anti-trade bias, we look 
at the cooperative case to ensure that our results are not driven by the terms of trade 
                                                 
34 Recall that β α = according to the estimates of Kahneman and Tversky (1992). 
35 We can also consider a situation in which the country is initially trading with the rest of the world and 
introduce a shock that goes in the opposite direction, that is, one that reduces output in sector 1 and 
increases output in sector 2. Now it is the export sector the one that loses, and loss aversion calls for higher 
protection in that sector (the size effect doing the opposite). Although in this case it is possible to obtain a 
pro-trade bias, it is also possible to still have an anti-trade bias if protection ends up being higher in sector 2 
than in sector 1, either because the size effect dominates or if we started out with a situation in 
which 1 2 t t >  (recall that this is what the model predicts that would arise when the country opens to trade, 
provided that the loss aversion coefficient is large enough). In addition, if the shock is sufficiently large we 
could have that the country reverts to autarky, in which case it is not clear that the government would want 
to protect sector 1 with an export subsidy instead of an import tariff, or even that the export sector turns 
into an import-competing sector and so the optimal policy becomes an import tariff. Consequently, we can 
have negative shocks to the export sector and still get an anti-trade bias. 
36 For example, consider a transfer of δ units of the specific factor of sector 2 from home to foreign and δ 
units of the factor specific to sector 1 from foreign to home.   20
motive. Let
w
i i i p p τ = , where  1 < i τ denotes an import subsidy or an export tax and 
1 > i τ denotes an import tariff or an export subsidy, and 
w
i p denotes the world price of 
good i. Under the GH model we have:
 37 
 







− = − y y
m ap
w τ τ         ( 1 2 )  
 
The right hand side is negative since 2 2 y y >
∗ , and therefore the export subsidy in the 
foreign country on good 2 would exceed the domestic tariff on good 2
38. Thus, the net 
effect of trade intervention across the two countries is to promote trade.
39  
In our model we have: 
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λ     (14) 
 
                                                 
37 See Levy (1999) or Grossman and Helpman (1995). 
38 We could also have an import subsidy that exceeds an export tax, since  2 τ and 
∗
2 τ are set so as to effect 
a transfer between the countries. But in any case, the net effect of intervention is to promote trade. 
39 We should point out that the original GH model does not rule out an anti-trade bias. We could introduce 
some asymmetries such as a larger weight on social welfare in one country. Nonetheless, this would make 
one country more likely to impose protection in all sectors, and as the predicted policies for one country 
become more plausible, the predicted policies for the other country would become less plausible.  
   21
which is exactly condition (10) replacing 
∗
2 y for  1 y . Hence, we have that if the coefficient 
of loss aversion is sufficiently large, there will be an anti-trade bias in trade policy in a 
model with two large economies.  
 
5. Endogenous Lobby Formation 
 
  So far we have considered the set of organized industries as exogenous. Mitra 
(1999) provides a theory of lobby formation in the framework of the GH model. We 
follow his approach in this section. 
  The model now has the following two stages: In the first stage, the owners of each 
kind of specific factor decide whether to contribute to the financing of the fixed costs of 
forming a lobby. The second stage reproduces the previous model where the lobbies 
provide the government with their contribution schedules and then the government sets 
trade policy to maximize a weighted sum of political contributions and social welfare. 
 Let  now  η denote the number of non-numeraire goods and therefore the potential 
number of lobbies, and let n denote the actual number of lobbies formed. In the second 
stage of the game we take the number of lobbies as given and solve for the equilibrium 
policies, obtaining the result given by (8). It then remains to solve for the number of 
lobbies that form in the first stage. 
 Let  o Ω and  u Ω respectively be the equilibrium gross welfare of an organized 
group and that of an unorganized group
40. Also, letC be the equilibrium contribution by a 
representative lobby and let the fixed cost of lobby formation for the ith group of specific 
factors be denoted by  i F . Then, this group will form a lobby if and only if: 
 
  i u o F C > − Ω − Ω          ( 1 5 )  
 
Let the groups be indexed in ascending order of their fixed costs, such that 
 
                                                 
40 They do not depend on n, since the equilibrium policies are independent of n by the assumption of 
concentration of ownership of the specific factors.   22
  max 1 2 1 min F F F F F F F n n ≤ < < < < ≤ + η L L  
 
Take the case of a continuous number of lobbies, with the total mass of non-numeraire 
goods normalized to unity, so that  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ n . Then  0 ) ( > ′ n F . Let NBrepresent the net 
benefit from forming a lobby (net of contributions), with 
 
  C NB u o − Ω − Ω =          ( 1 6 )  
 
The gross benefit is then: 
 
u o GB Ω − Ω =          
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assuming a situation in which a country opens to trade and allowing for a gain (with 
respect to the previous period) if the group becomes organized and either a loss or a gain 
if it remains unorganized. We will work under this context in the remainder of the 
section.
41 
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We have that 
GH
o o Π > Π and
GH
u u Π > Π since protection is higher under loss aversion, 




o u o Π − Π − Π − Π  unclear. But the additional protection 
associated with becoming organized is larger under loss aversion than under the GH 
                                                 
41 For simplicity, we do not explicitly include the case where the sector has a loss if it is organized, but 
doing so would not qualitatively change the results.   23
model.
42 Furthermore, we have two extra terms that are positive in the previous 
equation: () [] ( ) [ ] 0 / /
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > Π − Π + Π − Π
− − − − β α
λ E E u u u o and
() [] () [] 0 / /
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > Π − Π − Π − Π
− − − − α α
E E u u u o , for the cases when 
) 1 (− Π < Π u u  and 
) 1 (− Π ≥ Π u u , respectively.
 43 These terms reflect the fact that the (extra) gain associated 
with becoming organized has an additional effect on utility under loss aversion. The only 
effect that could go in the opposite direction is that the increase in output from becoming 
organized may be lower when the initial price (i.e. the price if the sector remains 
unorganized) is higher, as it is under loss aversion compared to the GH model, but recall 
that the increase in the price itself is also higher under loss aversion, as we already 
mentioned. Consequently, as long as profits are not too convex in the price, the gross 
benefit with loss aversion will exceed the gross benefit under the GH model. 
  With truthful contributions, the equilibrium contribution by an organized group is 
given by o o o b C − Ω = , where  o o o C b − Ω = is the net of contributions welfare 
(determined in equilibrium). As in Mitra (1999), we can show that in equilibrium a lobby 
contributes just enough to compensate for the reduction in social welfare brought about 
by its formation.  Letting  o W and  u W denote welfare (the sum of producer surplus, 
consumer surplus and tariff revenue) generated by an organized sector and that generated 
by an unorganized sector respectively, we can write that condition as follows: 
 
 ) ( u o W W a C − − =          ( 1 8 )  
 
We also have: 
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42 To see that, compare (A3) minus (A5) (given in the Appendix) to (9). Note that (9) is the additional 
protection associated with becoming organized under the GH model, since unorganized groups get zero 
protection. 
43 The term () [] ( ) [ ]
α α ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( / /
− − − − Π − Π − Π − Π E E u u u o is positive since u o Π > Π .   24
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i u o o o p m p p p Ns E W − + + Π − Π + Π =
− − α
   (20) 
 
From equations (16) and (18) to (20) we can obtain: 
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Since 0 ) ( = ′ n B N and 0 ) ( > ′ n F , there is a unique equilibrium with 
∗ n organized groups, 
where ) (
∗ = n F NB . 
  Under the original GH model, we have
44: 
 















GH p s p s aN p m p p a a NB − − − + Π − Π + =  (22) 
 
We can compare the net benefit of forming a lobby under loss aversion and under the GH 
model, by subtracting (22) from (21): 
 
                                                 
44 Note that if the sector remains unorganized it does not receive protection and the relevant price for that 
product is the world price.   25
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If we consider a sector that loses when opening the country to trade, we have that 
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That is, for a sufficiently high coefficient of loss aversion, the net benefit of forming a 
lobby will be higher than under the GH model, provided again that profits are not too 
convex in the price. This means that, for a given fixed cost, sectors that experience a loss 
when the country opens to trade will tend to form more lobbies once loss aversion is 
taken into account, since the additional protection associated with becoming organized is 
higher and there is an extra positive effect on utility from avoiding a loss.
45   
  Consider the shocks that were mentioned in the previous section, such as a shock 
that increases the endowment of the specific factor used in one sector and decreases that 
of the factor used in the other sector, a technological shock that increases productivity in 
                                                 
45 Note that asλ increases the direct effect of the sector’s loss in social welfare raises and that also tends to 
reduce the contribution that the sector has to give to the government. (See equations (18), (19) and (20)).   26
one sector and reduces productivity in the other, or a shock that increases the world price 
of one good and decreases the world price of the other. These shocks will cause the 
country to trade and lead to a loss for the import sector in the absence of protection. 
Hence, importers will be more likely to form a lobby once loss aversion is taken into 
account ifλ  is high enough, since their net benefit is then higher than in the GH model. 
As for the exporters (the sector that gains), we can see from equation (23) that we have 
the negative term () []
α ) 1 ( ) 1 ( /
− − Π − Π E u u instead of the positive term ( ) [ ]
β
λ
) 1 ( ) 1 ( /
− − Π − Π E u u , 
making it less likely that the net benefit under loss aversion exceeds the net benefit under 
the GH model. The reason is that exporters will experience a gain either if they become 
organized or not, and that reduces the cost of remaining unorganized.  
  Also, if profits are not too convex in the price and importers lose and exporters 
gain when the country begins to trade, we have that for a sufficiently high loss aversion 
coefficient, the net benefit of forming a lobby will be higher for the importers than for the 
exporters.
46, 47 Consequently, for a fixed cost that is lower than the net benefit for the 
importers but higher than that of the exporters, we have that importers will lobby for 
protection but exporters will not. These results make more likely that the trade policy will 
exhibit an anti-trade bias, the exact outcome depending on the fixed costs and net benefits 
of each sector. In particular, consider a situation in which we start with a symmetric 
equilibrium with a total mass of  non-numeraire sectors normalized to unity and introduce 
a shock that increases the endowment of the specific factors used in, say, the sectors 
] 2 / 1 , 0 [ ∈ n and decreases that of the factors used in the sectors  ] 1 , 2 / 1 [ ∈ n . Then, the 
                                                 
46 The exact condition is: 
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where the superscript E is used to denote the variables corresponding to the export sector, and x(pi
oE )are 
exports of good i. 
47 Having profits not to be too convex guaranties that when the coefficient of loss aversion increases, the 
increase in the extra effect on utility obtained from avoiding a loss plus the increase in the additional 
protection associated with becoming organized outweigh the potential effect that convexity would generate 
from the fact that the initial protection (i.e. the protection obtained when unorganized) also rises.   27
first half of sectors become export sectors and the remaining ones import sectors. Given 
symmetry in the fixed costs of becoming organized, we have that if the coefficient of loss 
aversion is sufficiently high, more import lobbies will form than export ones. 
 
6. Empirical Evidence 
 
  In this section we provide empirical evidence of the effects of loss aversion on 
trade policy. We focus initially on the protection equation and in section 6.4 we present 
evidence on loss aversion and lobby formation. 
 
6.1. Econometric Specification and Predictions 
 
  We apply a nonlinear regression procedure to directly estimate the structural 
parameters of the model and their standard errors. This differs from Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), which use linear specifications.
48 We 
describe the methodology in more detail in subsection 6.3. The prediction for the 
protection equation when we account for loss aversion is given by equation (8), on the 
basis of which we specify the following equation to be estimated: 
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We decided to take  i i e z ~ / ~  into the left-hand side for various reasons. First, the elasticities 
are likely to be measured with error. Second, both variables are potentially endogenous.
49 
Finally, leaving  i i e z ~ / ~ on the right-hand side would mean to have it interacted with all the 
                                                 
48 Mitra (2002) also performs a nonlinear estimation of the GH model for Turkey. 
49 Having those variables on the left-hand side eliminates the need to either instrument or specify separate 
equations for them. The alternative approach of leaving both variables on the right hand side and specifying 
additional equations for them has the caveat that, as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) point out, it is difficult to 
come out with a sensible reduced specification for the elasticities.   28
right-hand-side terms and that might confound the effect that losses and gains have on 
protection, which is our main focus, as well as introduce potential collinearity problems. 
In equation (E1),  i D  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the sector experienced a 
loss (i.e., if () ( )
) 1 ( ~ ~ − Π < Π i i i i p p ) and zero otherwise (i.e., if it experienced a gain, that is 
if () ( )
) 1 ( ~ ~ − Π > Π i i i i p p ). The use of that dummy allows us to estimate different 
coefficients for losses and gains, as predicted by the theory. We denote the parameters to 
be estimated by j γ , where 2 , 1 , 0 = j , and the regression error term by i ε . The error term 
is included to capture potential measurement error in the variables and other factors (not 
accounted for in the model) that may influence the determination of the policy. Since 
Kahneman and Tversky estimated bothα andβ  to be 0.88, we set  β α =  when we 
specify equation (E1).
50 From equations (8) and (E1), we obtain the following identities 
(which allow us to directly estimate the parameters of the model) and predictions: 
 
 i)  0 0 > = a γ , 
 ii)  ) 1 , 0 ( 1 ∈ = β γ , and 
 iii) 1 2 > = λ γ . 
The first prediction simply follows from the fact that the weight that the government 
places on social welfare should be positive. The second one comes from the fact that, 
according to the theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) there is diminishing 
sensitivity (i.e., the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their size) and 
henceβ should be between zero and one. The last prediction is implied by the definition 
of loss aversion, according to which losses have a larger impact on value or utility than 




  The data we use consists of 241 four digit SIC U.S. industries in 1983. Part of the 
data was kindly provided by Kishore Gawande, and the rest was obtained from the 
Annual Survey of Manufactures (henceforth ASM).  
                                                 
50 Later on we will mention what happens when we relax this assumption.   29
  Protection is measured by the NTB coverage ratio. Even though the theory calls 
for the use of ad valorem tariffs, an argument in favor of the use of NTBs is that U.S. 
tariffs in 1983 were determined by multilateral (GATT) tariff negotiations, while the 
model assumes that the country can set its tariffs unilaterally. We should point out that 
the use of coverage ratios has the potential problem that it may under or overstate 
protection; however, they are considered the best available measure of NTBs.
51 The 
import elasticities come from the estimates of Shiells et al. (1986), and since they have 
high standard errors, they were purged of the errors-in-variables problem by Gawande 
and Bandyopadhyay (2000) (henceforth GB).
52 z is measured as the gross output to 
import ratio. The politically organized industries were determined by GB (2000) by 
regressing the ratio of PAC spending to value added on bilateral import penetration (for 
five major partners) interacted with twenty two-digit SIC dummies. Those industries for 
which the predicted value of the dependent variable was positive were considered 
organized in the trade arena. The union of the sets of organized industries obtained for the 
five partners was then taken. 
  The terms that measure the losses and gains were obtained using data from the 
ASM. The numerator of  ()() [] ( )
β β ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ~ ~ − − − Π − Π i i i i i E p p was measured as the absolute 
value of the change in value added (VA) between 1983 and 1982 (raised to the power 
of 1 − β ). We use the change in VA as a measure of the change in the industry’s reward to 
the specific factors. The term in brackets in the denominator was defined as VA in 
1982.
53 We examined the sensitivity of the results to modifying the measures for the loss 
and gain variables, as we discuss in the next section. Finally, the value of  i D was 
determined according to whether the change in VA between 1983 and 1982 for industry i 
was negative or positive. 
 
                                                 
51 Trefler (1993) found a high correlation (0.78) between ad valorem tariffs and their coverage ratios, 
providing some evidence in favor of the use of coverage ratios. A more detailed discussion on the use of 
NTB coverage ratios can be found in Goldberg and Maggi (1999). Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) 
and Goldberg and Maggi (1999), among others, also use NTB coverage ratios as the measure for 
protection. 
52 A description of the procedure can be found in GB (2000). 
53 The model strictly calls for payments to the industry’s specific factors plus labor income in the 
denominator, but since we do not have a measure of labor income that the members of an industry may 





  From (E1) it can be seen that the right-hand side expression of the protection 
equation is nonlinear in both variables and parameters. In addition, the right-hand side 
variables may be correlated with the error term due to potential endogeneity of the 
political organization variable and the magnitude of the loss/gain of each industry, and to 
measurement error associated with I due to possible misclassification. Consequently, we 
will estimate the equation by nonlinear two-stage least squares (NL2SLS).
54  
  The instruments that we use include mainly industry characteristics, such as the 
capital-labor ratio interacted with industry-group dummies; the fraction of workers 
classified as unskilled, scientists and engineers, and managerial; output per firm (scale); 
the four-firm concentration ratio; the Herfindahl index of firm concentration; the share of 
output sold as intermediate goods; and a Herfindahl measure of intermediate-goods-
output buyer concentration. Those variables are included to instrument for the political 
organization variable, as has been done by other authors under the argument that they are 
correlated with that variable but not with the regression error. They can also be good 
instruments for the loss/gain variables since higher concentration or capital and skilled-
labor intensity may be associated with larger profits. But due to the presence of the 
loss/gain we also include the change in the wage between 1983 and 1982 (in percentage 
terms),
55 and the dummy variable that equals one if the industry’s change in VA is 
negative and zero if it is positive.
 56,57 The validity of the instruments was evaluated 
                                                 
54 According to that procedure the instruments can include not only the levels of the exogenous variables, 
but also their quadratic terms and cross-products. 
55 This variable was obtained as the ratio of payments to employees divided by the number of employees, 
using data from the ASM. 
56 The dummy is included to address an issue arising from the nonlinearity, since the protection equation is 
decreasing in the absolute value of the change in VA (i.e., it increases when the change in VA lies in the 
interval  ) 0 , (−∞ and it decreases when it lies in ) , 0 ( ∞ ) and the limit for the loss and gain terms is being 
defined at zero.  
57 Since including all the possible cross products would imply having too many instruments we include the 
linear terms, the squared terms, and the interaction of the linear terms with the dummy, scale, the 
Herfindahl index and the share of output sold as intermediate goods (this choice was based on the statistical 
significance of these variables in the first stage regressions). We estimated the model including interactions 
with other variables and the results were not significantly affected.   31
performing an overidentification test (described below). Also, we reestimate the model 
excluding some instruments that can be suspected to be at least “somewhat endogenous”, 




  The results of the NL2SLS estimation are presented in Table 1. All three 
parameters - λ β, and a- are statistically significant at the 1% level (individually and 
jointly). Moreover, the predictions i) to iii) (described in section 6.1.) are satisfied even 
though no restrictions were imposed in the estimation. The estimated value ofβ  was 
0.81, which is positive and lower than one (consistent with diminishing sensitivity), and it 
is close to the value of 0.88 obtained by Kahneman and Tversky (1992). Furthermore, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that 88 . 0 = β  (the probability was 0.25).λ was estimated 
to be 1.95, which is greater than one, providing evidence in favor of loss aversion (losses 
have a larger effect on protection than gains). Moreover, it is close to 2, consistent with 
the results of the previous literature. Also, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that 25 . 2 = λ , as estimated by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) (the probability was 0.67). 
Finally, the estimated value of a was positive, as expected, and lower than the value 
obtained by GB (2000). Their estimates of a, however, are very large and, as Gawande 
and Krishna (2003) say “(...) enough to cast doubt on the value of viewing trade policy 
determination through this political economy lens.” (p.20)  
  In addition, to evaluate the statistical significance of the right-hand side variables, 
we tested the hypotheses that the composite coefficients of 
()() [] ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ~ ~ γ γ − − − Π − Π × × i i i i i i i E p p D I ,  ( ) () [ ] ()
1 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ~ ~ γ γ − − − Π − Π × i i i i i i E p p D  
and () () [] ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ~ ~ ) 1 (
γ γ − − − Π − Π × − × i i i i i i i E p p D I are significant. That translates into the 
following hypotheses: 
 




0 = × × = λ β γ γ
γ a
H ,  
 2)  0 : 2 1 0 = × = ′ λ β γ γ H , and   32




0 = × = ″ β γ
γ a
H . 
The hypotheses involve nonlinear restrictions and therefore we used a Wald test. All 
three hypotheses can be rejected. The probabilities were 0.001, 0.013 and 0.003 for 1), 2) 
and 3) respectively. 
Table 1 
NL2SLS Estimates 
Parameter Value  Std.  Error 
β   0.808*** 0.063 
λ   1.948*** 0.714 
a  0.022*** 0.007 
R
2  0.154 
Adj. R
2  0.147 
Log-likelihood -1909.286 
Observations 241 
                   *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  We also carried out a White test for heteroskedasticity. The probability was 0.26, 
indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
  We should point out that although the dependent variable is censored below zero, 
the model is not predicting negative values for it. 
  We also estimated the model without setting β α = . The estimated value ofβ  was 
0.82 andα was 0.69. Although the value of α  was lower than the one ofβ , the former 
was estimated with less precision (the standard error was 0.296, compared to only 0.065 
forβ ).
58 Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that β α = , providing support 




  We examined the sensitivity of the results to changing the measure of the loss and 
gain variables. Instead of using VA, we used VA excluding payments to non-production 
                                                 
58 The values of the other parameters do not vary much (the value ofλ was 2.29 and a was estimated to be 
0.03).   33
workers (in the numerator and in the denominator of  ( ) () [ ] ()
β β ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ~ ~ − − − Π − Π i i i i i E p p ). 
An argument for the use of this measure is that non-production workers may be 
considered more mobile.
59 The results still hold. All three parameters were statistically 
significant at the 1% level.β  was equal to 0.84, λ was 1.37 (which is lower than the 
previous value but still greater than one, consistent with loss aversion), and a was 0.02. 
  In addition, we evaluated the sensitivity of the results to alternative treatments of 
the political organization variable. First, we experimented with the alternative of 
estimating a probit regression of I on the instruments and replacing the fitted values from 
that regression into the right-hand side of equation (E1) before doing the nonlinear 
estimation. The estimated values of λ β,  and a were 0.84, 2.07 and 0.02, respectively, 
which are very close to those from the previous estimation. Second, we also did the 
estimation treating I as econometrically exogenous. The estimatedβ  was 0.75, λ was 
2.28 and a was 0.03 (all were statistically significant at least at the 5% level). Again, the 
results do not vary significantly.
60 Finally, given that we have obtained predictions on the 
lobbying side by endogenizing lobby formation and in Section 6.4 we estimate a political 
organization equation, in that section we also discuss the results that we obtain by 
replacing the data on I with an ex post classification based on that regression. 
  We performed a test of overidentifying restrictions to asses the validity of the 
instruments and we find that cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the excluded 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error and correctly excluded from the estimated 
equation, providing support for the assumption that the set of instruments is valid.
 61  
  As we mentioned before, however, some of the instruments can be suspected to 
be endogenous (although they have been used by previous authors), in particular the 
capital-labor ratios and the fraction of workers in each category.
62 We reestimated 
equation (E1) excluding those variables from the set of instruments. The estimated values 
                                                 
59 The argument for the use of VA without excluding payments to non-production workers, however, is that 
the owners of capital in an industry may also own the skilled labor. 
60 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) also say that their results remain very similar when they treat I as 
exogenous. 
61 The statistic was 102.55 and the corresponding Chi-squared value was 104.13. The statistic was 
calculated as the number of observations times the uncentered R
2 from a regression of the NL2SLS 
residuals on the instruments. The number of degrees of freedom for the Chi-squared equals the number of 
overidentifying restrictions. 
62 Factor shares could be endogenous because they may respond to price changes induced by protection.   34
of λ β,  and a were 0.84, 1.72 and 0.02, respectively, which do not differ much from the 
ones previously obtained. Also, they were all significant at the 1% level. 
  Furthermore, although one could expect the right-hand side variables in equation 
(E1) to be potentially endogenous, we performed a Hausman test to evaluate such 
possible endogeneity.
63 We found that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the right-
hand side variables are exogenous. The results of estimating the model treating the right-
hand side variables as exogenous (by nonlinear least squares) are reported in Table 2. 
They are qualitatively similar to those that we obtained when we used instrumental 
variables, and quantitatively they do not change much. In particular, the coefficient of 
loss aversion is estimated to be 2.39, which is again greater than one, as predicted by loss 
aversion, and close to 2, consistent with the findings of the previous literature.  
Table 2 
NLLS Estimates 
Parameter Value  Std.  Error 
β   0.774*** 0.056 
λ   2.386*** 0.918 
a  0.032*** 0.011 
R
2  0.160 
Adj. R
2  0.153 
Log-likelihood -1908.380 
Observations 241 
                   *** Significant at 1%. 
 
Nonetheless, an argument for the use instrumental variables is that when we applied the 
same Hausman test to an estimation that is linear in the parameters we did reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity. The linear estimation (linear in the parameters although not in 
the regressors) was performed using two-stage least squares with the same set of 
instruments described earlier. The loss and gain terms were defined replacingβ  by a 
numerical value (instead of estimating it) and all their coefficients were found to be 
positive, as expected, and statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% level. We used 
0.88 as the value ofβ , based on the estimates obtained by Kahneman and Tversky 
                                                 
63 The test was carried out by including the residuals obtained from regressing each of the potentially 
endogenous variables on the instruments into the equation to be estimated by NLLS and then testing for the 
joint significance of those residuals.   35
(1992).
64 There were again four terms related to the losses/gains (one for the loss 
interacted with I, one for the loss interacted with (1- I ) and two corresponding terms for 
the gains).
65 With the linear estimation we do not immediately obtain the estimate of the 
coefficient of loss aversion (λ ), but it is still possible to obtain it as the ratio of the loss 
and gain coefficients (according to the model, the ratio is exactly equal toλ for both the 
organized and the unorganized industries, i.e., the terms interacted with I and 1- I ). We 
found that ratio to be equal to 2.85 for the unorganized industries and 2.10 for the 
organized ones, providing evidence in favor of loss aversion. Moreover, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that those two ratios are equal, as predicted by the model (the 
probability was 0.68). A Wald test to determine whether the coefficients of losses and 
gains are different was also carried out, and we find that we reject the null hypothesis that 
they are equal for both organized and unorganized industries, with probabilities 0.017 and 




  In this subsection we use the results that we obtained in the NL2SLS estimation to 
quantify the effects that the change in VA has on protection, comparing the effects of 
losses and gains as well as the cases of organized and unorganized industries.  
  As we mentioned before, diminishing sensitivity means that the marginal value of 
both gains and losses decreases with their size. This in turn implies that, everything else 
equal, higher protection will be given to industries with lower changes (for both, losses 
                                                 
64 We also experimented with the value ofβ that we obtained in the nonlinear estimation, 0.81, and the 
results were qualitatively similar, and quantitatively they changed very little. According to the 
theory,β should take values between zero and one, consistent with diminishing sensitivity. Hence, to study 
the sensitivity of the results to the value of that parameter, we did the linear estimation replacingβ with 
values starting with 0.1 and adding 0.1 each time until 0.9 was reached (a value of 0.95 was also used). The 
value ofβ that was associated with the highest R
2 was 0.8 (the R
2 decreases monotonically as we either 
increase or decrease the value of β from 0.8). Again, this value is close to the one estimated by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1992). 
65 This is equivalent to having the losses and gains interacted with I and then not interacted (instead of 
interacted with 1- I ), in the sense that they are both structural estimations, and only the interpretation of the 
coefficient changes.  The reason why we did not follow the other possibility is that in that case 
multicollinearity problems are more likely to arise (the correlation between the term interacted with I and 
the one not interacted was 0.97 for losses and 0.88 for gains, while the correlation between the term 
interacted with I and that interacted with 1- I was only -0.06 for losses and -0.14 for gains).   36
and gains), as can be seen from equation (8). That relation can be observed in Figure 3, 
which plots the fitted values of the protection variable (given by NTB/(1+NTB)) against 







































  To compare the effects that losses and gains have on protection, we calculated the 
fitted values of protection that the industries with losses would receive according to the 
estimated values of the parameters, and also the values of protection that those same 
industries would receive had their losses been gains instead. 
67 It can be seen in Figure 4 
that losses are associated with higher protection than gains (everything else equal), and 
that the absolute value of the difference decreases with the value of the change in VA. 
Figure 4 





































                                                 
66 We should point out that since there is a direct effect on utility generated by changes income with respect 
to its reference level, if a sector experiences a gain, loss aversion leads to an increase in protection. 
(Nonetheless, for two sectors that are symmetric in everything except that one had a loss and the other a 
gain of equal magnitude, loss aversion leads to higher protection for the sector that experienced a loss).  
67 That is, multiplying the changes in VA by minus one and computing the protection values using the 
parameters corresponding to gains, keeping everything else equal   37
  Whereas in Figure 3 we included all industries, Figure 5 plots the fitted values of 
protection only for the organized industries, and Figure 6 plots the values of protection 
that would correspond to those same industries if they were unorganized.
68 We include 
these additional figures because under loss aversion we have, besides the political 
economy motive for protection, a social welfare motive, and we want to quantify how 
important the latter is relative to the former. We can see that the unorganized industries 
get much lower protection,
69 indicating that the political economy motive for protection 









































































                                                 
68  That is, changing only the value of the political organization variable from one to zero. 
69 Note that the scale of the vertical axis is different in both figures.   38
  Row (2) of Table 3 shows the predicted value of protection calculated at the mean 
value of  e z/ for an organized and an unorganized industry assuming that the change in 
VA is zero. Row (1) shows the predicted value of protection assuming a 10% change in 
VA (calculated at the mean value of VA in 1982 and  e z/ ), for an organized industry for 
which the change was negative (a loss), an organized industry for which the change was 
positive (a gain), and similarly for an industry that is unorganized.
70 We can see that the 
increase in protection (shown in row (3)) when we compare the cases of no change and 
10% change in VA is roughly twice as much if the change is negative than if it is positive 
(for both organized and unorganized industries). The table also shows that, everything 
else equal, an organized industry gets much higher protection than an unorganized one, as 
we mentioned before. 
Table 3 
NTB/(1+NTB) 
  Organized   Unorganized 
  Loss Gain    Loss Gain 
(1) 10% change in VA  0.7382 0.5368    0.0089 0.0046 
(2) No change in VA  0.3244  0.0000 
(3) Increase: (1) – (2)  0.4138 0.2124    0.0089 0.0046 
 
6.3.5. Model Selection 
 
  Table 4 presents some information criteria corresponding to our model and the 
original GH model (i.e., dropping the four regressors associated to the losses and gains 
from the right-hand side of (E1)).
71 Lower values are preferred and thus both the Akaike 
(AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) provide evidence in favor of our 
model. 
                                                 
70 We should point out that a 10 percent change is the median change in VA for the whole sample, and it is 
very close to the median changes for both organized and unorganized industries, which are 11 percent and 
9 percent, respectively. 
71 The prediction for protection in the GH model (with  e z/ in the left-hand side) is given by 
( ) i i i i i I a e z t t ) 1 ( ) ~ ~ /( ) ~ 1 ( ~ = + . The coefficient of the political organization variable in the estimation of 




Criterion  Loss Aversion  GH 1994 
Akaike
1  15.870 16.077 
Schwarz
2  15.913 16.091 
Log Likelihood  -1909.286  -1936.237 
               1. AIC = -2L/n + 2k/n 
               2. SIC = -2L/n + k logn/n 
 
  Since in the theoretical model we made the assumption of concentration of 
ownership of the specific factors, two additional model comparisons may be worthy. The 
first one is comparing the original GH model without imposing that assumption (which 
we will call the unrestricted GH model)
72 against the GH model including the assumption 
(the information appearing in Table 4 corresponds to the last case). The second one is to 
compare our loss aversion model to the GH model without concentration in specific 
factor ownership, which is a comparison of nonnested models.  
  We estimated the unrestricted GH model by 2SLS, and obtained a value of 16.026 
for the AIC and 16.055 for the SIC.
73 These values are lower than those of the GH model 
that includes the assumption of concentration (which appear in Table 4). Hence, both 
information criteria favor the unrestricted GH model over the restricted one.  
  Since the unrestricted GH model was estimated by a linear regression procedure 
(linear in the parameters), we compare it to the linear estimation of the model with loss 
aversion, which was discussed in the previous subsection. The models are nonnested, and 
therefore we use the J test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon.
74 When we include 
the fitted values from the unrestricted GH model in the estimation of our model we find 
that they are not statistically significant (the probability was 0.37), and thus we reject the 
GH model. On the other hand, when we include the fitted values from the loss aversion 
                                                 
72 In that case the protection equation is: ( ) ( ) () ) ( ) ( 1 ) ~ ~ /( ) ~ 1 ( ~
L L i L i i i i a I a e z t t α α α + − + = + , 
where L α denotes the proportion of the population that is organized. 
73 With  e z/ in the left-hand side the unrestricted model is equal to the restricted one plus a constant term, 
and both models can be nested. 
74 See Davidson and McKinnon (1993).   40
model in the GH model estimation we find that they are significant (the probability was 
0.00), and therefore we cannot reject the loss aversion model. Hence, we conclude that 
the data also favors our model over the unrestricted GH model. 
 
6.4. Evidence on Loss Aversion and Lobby Formation 
 
  In this section we estimate a lobby formation equation based on the prediction 
that we obtained in Section 5, and test for the presence of loss aversion in lobby 
formation. Equation (21) shows the net benefit of forming a lobby. We will not perform a 
structural estimation because we do not have information that allows us to directly 
measure the effects that an industry that becomes organized generates on producer 
surplus, consumer surplus and tariff revenue (i.e., to compare each of these if the industry 
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   (E2) 
In equation (E2), the dependent variable is the political organization dummy (see section 
6.2). A prediction of the model is that, for a sufficiently high coefficient of loss aversion, 
a sector that experienced a loss will be more likely to form a lobby than one that 
experienced a gain, because the direct effect on utility as well as the extra protection 
associated with becoming organized are higher for the sector with a loss. Since in a one 
year period there may not be sufficient activity in terms of lobby formation, we measure 
the losses and gains over a longer period of time (1979-1983). Thus,  i d is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the change in VA between 1979 and 1983 was negative and 
zero if it was positive. To determine the change in VA between 1979 and 1983 we 
calculated a rate of growth using the percentage changes between 1979-80, 1980-81 and 
1982-1983, since due to a change in the reporting instructions the data of 1983 and 1982 
are not directly comparable to those of the previous years.
75 Given that besides the 
                                                 
75 Since ()( ) ( )
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 /
− − − − − ∆Π = ∆Π E E E
β β β and the percentage change in VA for the period gives us a 
measure of term inside brackets in the numerator, we then divide the numerator (raised to the power of 
1 − β ) by the initial income, measured as VA in 1979.   41
loss/gain of the industry, the amount of the deadweight loss also affects the net benefit of 
forming a lobby we include i e , which denotes the elasticity of import demand;  i i y m /i s  
the import-output ratio;
76
i X is a vector that contains measures of concentration 
traditionally used in the political economy literature and that could also proxy to some 
extent for the fixed cost of forming a lobby, as well as factor shares; and i µ is the error 
term. More precisely,  i X includes the four-firm concentration ratio (Conc4), the 
Herfindahl index of concentration (LHerf), the capital-labor ratio interacted by industry 
group dummies (KL_Cap, KL_Res and KL_Mfg), and the fraction of workers classified 
as unskilled (P_Uns), scientists and engineers (P_Sci), and managerial (P_Man). 
  We should point out that since the GH (1994) model treats lobby formation as 
exogenous, the fact that we test some predictions obtained by endogenizing lobby 
formation differs from Goldberg and Maggi (1999), who estimate a separate equation for 
I but only including variables of the kind that we have on the i X vector, and from GB 
(2000), who estimate an equation on contributions but not on lobby formation. 
  Since the dependent variable is binary and some of the right-hand side variables 
are potentially endogenous (the loss/gain, the elasticity and the import-output ratio), we 
estimate a probit model using the two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) 
estimator proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988).
77 We use the same instruments as 
before.
78 The results appear on Table 5, which includes two estimations: one in which we 
replaceβ  by 0.88 (the value estimated by Kahneman and Tversky [1992]), and the other 
one with 81 . 0 = β (the value that we obtained in the nonlinear estimation of the protection 
equation). Both regressions give similar results. We found that we cannot reject the null 
hypotheses of exogeneity of the right-hand side variables.
79 The main predictions that we 
want to test are that losses and gains are statistically significant and that losses have a 
                                                 
76 We would expect this variable to negatively affect the probability of forming a lobby since higher 
imports imply a larger social cost from an increase in protection and a lower output means that the industry 
has less to gain from higher protection. 
77 According to that procedure, in the first stage we regress the potentially endogenous variables on the 
instruments (by least squares) and then we estimate the probit model including the residuals from the first 
stage as additional regressors. A convenient feature of the procedure is that we can test for exogeneity by 
evaluating the statistical significance of those residuals. 
78 Changes between 1983 and 1982 were replaced by changes between 1983 and 1979. We should point out 
that all the first-stage R-squares were greater than 0.40. 
79 The residuals added to the probit regressions were not statistically significant (individually nor jointly).   42
higher coefficient than gains, that is 2 1 δ δ > . As predicted, we find that both losses and 
gains are statistically significant at the 5% level, and that losses have a larger coefficient 
than gains, consistent with loss aversion. The ratio of those coefficients was 1.94 
when 88 . 0 = β , suggesting a coefficient of loss aversion that is again in the neighborhood 
of 2. Moreover, we can not reject the null hypotheses that the ratio is equal to 2.25, which 
is the value estimated by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) (the probability was 0.77). 
When 81 . 0 = β , the ratio was 1.76, which is lower but still not statistically different from 
2.25 (the probability was 0.56). Thus, we find evidence of loss aversion in lobby 
formation. An industry is more likely to become organized if it experienced a loss, 
everything else equal.  
  As for the other variables, the import-output ratio has the expected sign and it is 
significant at the 10% level. The elasticity has a positive coefficient (contrary to what we 
would expect) but it is not significant. Regarding the variables included in the i X vector, 
as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) point out, the literature does not yield unambiguous 
predictions for the signs of their coefficients. According to our results the proportion of 
scientists and engineers and managers, as well as the capital labor ratios (except for one 
group of industries) are statistically significant. Mitra (1999) finds that when introducing 
heterogeneity on the capital stock, industries with high levels of capital stock get 
organized. This seems consistent with our finding that all the capital labor ratios have 
positive coefficients. 
  As we mentioned in section 6.3.3, we did a last sensitivity analysis by 
reestimating the protection equation (E1) using a political organization variable obtained 
based on the estimation of equation (E2). We classified an industry as organized if the 
predicted probability of being organized from the probit estimation discussed in this 
section was at least 0.6.
80 The estimated values of λ β,  and a were 0.84, 2.15 and 0.02, 
respectively, which are very close to the results shown in section 6.3 (all three parameters 
were significant at the 1% level). 
 
                                                 
80 This gives us 149 organized industries. We should point out that using  88 . 0 = β (the value obtained by 
Kahneman and Tversky [1992]) and using  81 . 0 = β (the value that we obtained when we estimated the 
protection equation) give exactly the same results in terms of which industries are classified as organized.   43
Table 5 
Probit (2SCML) Estimates 
  88 0. = β     81 0. = β  
Variable  Coef.  S. Error    Coef.  S. Error 
Constant      -0.741  1.825       -0.747  1.831 
Loss
1       0.219**  0.088        0.167**  0.068 
Gain
2       0.113**  0.058        0.095**  0.047 
e       0.631  0.572        0.615  0.573 
m/y     -2.023*  1.156       -1.926*  1.146 
Conc4     -0.756  1.312       -0.737  1.311 
P_Uns     -2.040  3.065       -2.036  3.085 
P_Sci     11.837***  3.659       11.736***  3.651 
P_Man     -6.118*  3.443       -6.006*  3.437 
KL_Cap       0.014  0.023        0.015  0.023 
KL_Res       0.514***  0.105        0.512***  0.105 
KL_Mfg       0.110**  0.051        0.111**  0.052 
LHerf      -0.074  0.246       -0.072  0.246 
Log Likelihood  -109.67    -109.61 
McFadden R
2  0.27   0.27 
Observations 241    241 
           *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
           1. Loss =  ()
β β ) 1 ( 1 ) (
− − ∆Π × i i i E d  
           2. Gain =  ( )
β β ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) 1 (




  We study the effects of loss aversion on trade policy determination and show how 
it allows us to explain some important and puzzling features of trade policy. As Rodrik 
(1995) points out, it constitutes an important puzzle the fact that trade policy is typically 
biased in favor of import competing sectors, and it is therefore trade restricting rather 
than trade promoting. The current leading political economy model of trade protection, 
due to Grossman and Helpman (1994), cannot explain the anti-trade bias in trade policy 
and, in fact, as Levy (1999) shows, under some symmetry assumptions it predicts a pro-
trade bias. Likewise, it does not explain why protection is usually given to sectors in 
which profits and employment are declining. We show that if individual preferences 
exhibit loss aversion and the degree of loss aversion is sufficiently large, there will be an 
anti-trade bias under the same neutrality assumptions made by Levy (1999). The cases in   44
which symmetry is not imposed are also analyzed, leading to a qualitatively similar 
conclusion. The results hold for a variety of shocks that lead the country to trade with the 
rest of the world. They also hold for two large countries even after the terms-of-trade 
motive for protection is removed. By allowing lobby formation to be endogenous, we 
then show that, for a sufficiently high coefficient of loss aversion, more import-
competing lobbies will form than under the GH model, and that import-competing sectors 
will be more likely to form a lobby than export sectors, which reinforces the anti-trade 
bias result. We also show that, if there is loss aversion, sectors in which profitability is 
declining will receive higher protection, everything else equal. 
  We use a nonlinear regression procedure to directly estimate the parameters of the 
model and test the empirical validity of its predictions. We find empirical support for the 
model and, very importantly, we obtain estimates of the parameters that are very similar 
to those estimated by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) using experimental data. In 
particular, we find that losses have a larger impact on protection than gains, and we 
obtain estimates of the coefficient of loss aversion that are about 2. To our knowledge, no 
previous paper has provided econometric estimates from other than experimental data of 
all the parameters of the value function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1992). We 
also find that the data favors our model over the GH model. These results contrast with 
those of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999), who find 
that the introduction of additional variables in the estimation of the GH model does not 
significantly improve its explanatory power. Our approach differs from theirs, however, 
in that we have a well-specified alternative hypothesis.  
  Additionally, we estimate a Probit equation on political organization using the 
two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Rivers and Vuong 
(1988) and we find evidence of loss aversion in lobby formation, consistent with our 
theoretical prediction. The fact that we test some predictions derived by endogenizing 
lobby formation also differs from the empirical work of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999), who estimate a version of the GH model in 
which lobby formation is considered exogenous.   45
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Appendix 
 
A. Equilibrium Policies 
 
  First, we derive the equilibrium policies for the organized sectors. Given that 
there is no interaction between lobbies, the condition that, for every lobby i, the 
equilibrium price vector maximizes the joint welfare of that lobby (net of contributions) 
and the government (condition (c) on footnote 23), implies that: 
 
  { } { } ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( max arg
0 0 0 p p aW p W aW p C p C p W p i i i i i i i i i + = + + − ≡  (A1) 
 
The first-order condition is: 
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where 
∗ ∗ − = i i i i p p p t / ) ~ ( ~ is the equilibrium ad valorem trade tax or subsidy for  L i∈ , 
) ~ ( / ) ~ ( ~
i i i i i p m p y z = is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports (negative for 
exports) and  ) ~ ( / ~ ) ~ ( ~
i i i i i i p m p p m e ′ − = is the elasticity of import demand (defined to be 
positive) or export supply (defined to be negative). 
 
In the case of the unorganized sectors, the first-order condition (A2) becomes: 
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where 1 = i I if  L i∈ and zero otherwise. 
 
 
B. Anti-Trade Bias Condition (Small Economy) 
 
  Using equation (A3) we have that protection in sector 2 will exceed protection in 
sector 1 if and only if:  
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) 1 ( − − − = = E E E , given symmetry. 